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MUNICIPAL FREE SPEECH: BANNED IN BOSTON?
INTRODUCTION

Prior to the 1977 Term of the Supreme Court, the identity of a speaker had
not clearly been the basis of controversy in first amendment free speech cases.
Historically, free speech litigants have belonged to four identifiable classes
whose protection under the first amendment has not been in serious dispute:
individuals,' representative groups, 2 media corporations, 3 and corporations
speaking as to commercial matters. 4 As a result, previous decisions have
resolved the proper extent of the seemingly absolute constitutional guarantee s
without addressing the issue of identity. Moreover, the mode of analysis
embraced by the Court has firmly emphasized the societal values inhering in
the enlarged pool of information afforded by freedom of speech. 6 As a
consequence, the value of free self-expression to the individual speaker has
been reduced to a secondary interest, 7 obviating the need to examine the
speaker's identity in that connection.
In this context, the Supreme Court's decision in First National Bank v.
Bellotti s is significant. In a case involving the constitutionality of a state
statute barring corporate spending intended to influence the results of a
referendum, except when the subject "materially affected" corporate business,
the parties squarely presented the Court with the issue of the speaker's
identity. 9 Bellotti also raised other free speech considerations which had been
resolved in earlier cases,' 0 including the protection of financial support as a
1. E.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (individual's display of profane antidraft
slogan held protected); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (individual's display of red
flag protected as symbolic speech).
2.: E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (nonprofit corporation may assert first
--amendment claim); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (nonprofit
corporation has standing to assert the first amendment rights of its members).
3. E.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (corporate plaintiff magazine publisher
may assert that state libel laws violate first amendment); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 (1936) (corporate plaintiff newspaper publisher may assert that state license tax on
newspapers violates first amendment).
4. E.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (town ordinance banning
realty corporation from posting "For Sale" sign held unconstitutional); cf. Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (nonprofit corporation may assert the "rights of hearers" to commercial information about prescription drug prices).
5. See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245; Justice
Black and First Aniendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y. U. L. Rev. 549 (1962) ("no
law" means no law). But cf. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ('[T]he Constitution
... does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish .... "); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.").
6. See notes 28-33 infra and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804-05 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
8. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
9. Brief for Appellee at 13, First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
10. Although the quantum of information analysis proposed by the Court in Bellotti is similar
to the approach utilized in commercial free speech cases, see, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S.
350 (1977) (social interest in commercial information held to outweigh state interest in regulating
the legal profession), Bellotti did not involve commercial speech because the subject of corporate
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form of speech 1 and the recognition of the right to dissent from compelled
12
support, financial or otherwise, of an ideologically objectionable message.
The complexity of these issues, and the uniqueness of the corporate political
speech context, produced four separate opinions, which treated the first
amendment issues in drastically different ways.
This Note will first consider the Bellotti decision, with a particular view
toward its extension to other, possibly unanticipated areas. It will specifically
address a situation that Bellotti may be said to have fathered-Anderson v.
City of Boston13-and will discuss whether the first amendment interests
identified in Bellotti apply equally and compel a similar result when a
municipal corporation seeks to employ tax funds to advocate support for one
side of a referendum issue.
I.

First National Bank v. Bellotti

The issue of corporate speech did not make an entirely meteoric appearance
when the Supreme Court found section 8 of Massachusetts General Laws
chapter 5514 unconstitutional; that neither the issue, nor its surrounding
factual circumstances, developed unexpectedly is indicated by the statute's
lengthy history. In force in various forms since 1907, the statute originated as
a flat ban on corporate expenditures in connection with elections and referenda. 5 Subsequent amendments allowed expenditures, but only when the
question on the ballot affected the acquisition of a corporation's property or
assets.' 6 A further liberalization authorized expenditures designed to influence
the outcome of a referendum, provided the issue was one "materially affecting
. . . [the] business . . . of the corporation."' 17 In litigation arising from
referenda on state constitutional amendments to authorize graduated income
taxation, corporate expenditures were upheld via an expansive construction of
the statutory "materially affecting" standard. 18
advocacy in that case did not relate simply to commercial transactions. See Friedman v. Rogers,
99 S. Ct. 887, 895 N.10 (1979).
11. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (the contribution of money to the campaign of
an individual candidate is protected speech). For a further discussion of Buckley, see notes 131-33
infra and accompanying text.
12. E.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (use of the agency shop "dues"
of a dissenter to finance political activities held to infringe upon first amendment rights); Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (compulsory display of ideologically objectionable slogan on
state mandated license plate held unconstitutional).
Mass. -, 380 N.E.2d 628 (1978), appeal dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 822 (1979).
13. 14. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 55, § 8 (Michie Law./Co-op 1978).
15. Act of June 28, 1907, ch. 581, 1907 Mass. Acts 929 (current version at Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 55, § 8 (Michie Law./Co-op 1978)).
16. Act of Mar. 7, 1938, ch. 75, 1938 Mass. Acts 50 (current version at Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
55, § 8 (Michie Law./Co-op 1978)).
17. Act of May 14, 1943, ch. 273, 1943 Mass. Acts 286 (current version at Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 55, § 8 (Michie Law./Co-op 1978)).
18. In Lustwerk v. Lytron, Inc., 344 Mass. 647, 183 N.E.2d 871 (1962), a corporation's
expenditure advocating the defeat of a proposed personal income tax was challenged by a
shareholder. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, holding as a matter of statutory
construction that such an issue materially affected the business of a corporation, upheld the
expenditure, thereby rendering unnecessary consideration of the defendant corporation's con-
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Fearing that corporate influence had caused the continued voter rejection of
income tax referenda proposals, the Massachusetts legislature further refined
chapter 55 in 1975. In its final form, the statute provided:
No corporation carrying on the business of a bank . . . [or] business corporation
incorporated under the laws of or doing business in the commonwealth . . . shall
directly or indirectly give, pay, expend or contribute . . . any money . . . for the

purpose of . . . influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the
voters, other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the
corporation. No question . . . solely concerning the taxation of the income . . . of
individuals shall be deemed materially to affect . . . the corporation. 19

This latter version gave rise to the Bellotti litigation when, in 1976, two
national banks and three corporations brought an action seeking to have the
statute declared unconstitutional. The parties planned to advertise their
opposition to the adoption of a state constitutional amendment authorizing an
individual income tax, and anticipated prosecution under the statute by the
20
state Attorney General.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the plaintiff corporations were without first amendment protection in this instance, and, therefore,
the statute's restriction on corporate activity would not be subjected to
exacting scrutiny. 2 1 Addressing the broader issue of whether a corporation
could be said to "have" first amendment rights equivalent to those of natural
persons, the court distinguished the protectable elements of liberty and
property under the fourteenth amendment..2 2 Citing Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,2 3 it stated that the guarantee of liberty, of which first amendment free
stitutional defense of its actions based on the first amendment. The statute was further amended
in 1972 to abrogate the holding of Lustwerk; the amendment specifically provided that "[nlo
question... concerning the taxation of the income.., of individuals shall be deemed materially
to affect . . . the corporation." Act of June 20, 1972, ch. 458, 1972 Mass. Acts 274 (current
version at Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 55, § 8 (Michie Law./Co-op 1978)) (emphasis added). A corporate
expenditure for advertising urging the defeat of a proposed general income tax on both
corporations and individuals was, however, upheld in First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen., 362
Mass. 570, 290 N.E.2d 526 (1972). Three justices, concurring, stated that the statutory restriction
applied only when an income tax on individuals alone was at issue. Id. at 594, 290 N.E.2d at 541
(Quirico, J., concurring). Two justices, reproaching the others for a strained statutory construction, argued that first amendment protection should not be limited to media corporations, and
that the state's interest in ensuring free elections was not sufficiently compelling to require
suppression of corporate activities absent a showing of inordinate corporate influence. Id. at
589-90, 290 N.E.2d at 539. Further amendment of the statute effectively codified the concurring
justices' position in this case. See note 19 infra and accompanying text.
19. Act of Apr. 28, 1975, ch. 151, § 8, 1975 Mass. Acts Ill (codified at Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
55, § 8 (Michie Law./Co-op 1978)) (emphasis added). The statute was criminal in nature, and
provided for a maximum $50,000 fine on the corporation. Id.
20. First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney Gen., Mass.....
-,
359 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (1976).
One of the corporate plaintiffs was a Delaware corporation doing business in Mas'sachusetts; the
other two were organized under Massachusetts law. Id. at 359 N.E.2d at 1266.
21. Id. at __, 359 N.E.2d at 1275.
22. Id. at __, 359 N.E.2d at 1269.
23. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In Pierce, two corporations in the business of private schooling
challenged an Oregon statute requiring compulsory public school education. While stating that
corporations cannot claim protection of the fourteenth amendment liberty interest, the Court
found that the statute unconstitutionally abridged the business and property interests of the
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speech is a part, extended to natural persons only. Because "a corporation's
property and business interests are entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection, ' 24 however, the corporation may assert a right to constitutional protection for speech in defense of or incident to those interests. In effect, the court
found that the materially affecting standard properly defined the scope of
protected corporate expression, and that, therefore, a corporate campaign to
influence public opinion in other areas was without constitutional protection.
Further consideration of the statutory language that deemed taxation not to
affect corporations was rendered unnecessary by plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate any way in which the taxation referendum result would have materially
25
affected their business.
At the outset, the Supreme Court faced two distinct yet interrelated issues
in its consideration of the appeal in Bellotti.26 The Court's majority and
dissenting opinions intertwine the theoretical issue of the proper approach to
first amendment analysis generally with the more concrete issue of discerning
the rationale of previous free speech cases involving corporations. 27 The line
separating the two issues is somewhat uncertain because the determination of
the correct means of analysis must rely, at least in part, on the interpretation
of precedent, and, in turn, a reading of the cases must be colored by the
approach selected. Yet the issues seem sufficiently discrete to be treated
separately.
A.

The Approach to First Amendment Analysis

The Supreme Court majority criticized the Massachusetts Court's analysis
because it made the corporation's identity dispositive of the case. The Court
substituted for the lower court's inquiry into corporate rights the question of
whether the statute restrained a type of expression protected by the first
amendment, without regard to the party involved. 28 The dissent, however,
acknowledged the same distinction between corporate and individual identity
on which the lower court relied. 29 At the heart of this analytical controversy is
a dispute over the relative weight of two chief interests that the first
amendment protects. The majority stressed the tendency of free speech to
encourage the unfettered exchange of ideas, emphasizing in particular the
value of information when a political question is involved. 30 Lively and open
schools, noting that enforcement of the statute would have virtually destroyed both corporations.
Id. at 535.
24.
25.

-

Id.

Mass. at -,
359 N.E.2d at 1270.
at __,
359 N.E.2d at 1270-71. The statutory provision that no such individual

taxation question could be deemed to be materially affecting was judged to be neither overbroad,
void for vagueness, nor without rational basis. Id. at -, 359 N.E.2d at 1271-74. Furthermore,
the statute was construed not to restrict "in-house," intra-corporate communications. Id. at -'
359 N.E.2d at 1272.
26. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Because the 1976 referendum had been held, resulting in the defeat
of the taxation proposal, the initial issue addressed by the Court was mootness. The controversy
was held to be "capable of repetition, yet evading review." and therefore not moot. Id. at 774
(quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
27.

See 435 U.S. at 776, 782; id. at 804-05, 807 (White, J., dissenting).

28. Id. at 775-76.
29. Id. at 804 (White, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 776-77.
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discussion ensures that contending ideas are subjected to critical consideration, enlarging the basis of information on which citizens may make a wise
choice. 3 ' The dissent was as firmly convinced that the first amendment
promotes the intangible personal ideal of self-expression. 32 Individual selfrealization is enhanced when people 33are not restricted in their speech, and are
consequently free in their thought.
The importance of this difference in approach is evident: when the issue of
the party's identity is one of first impression, as in Bellotti, the decision on the
purposes served by the first amendment is potentially outcome determinative.
At its extreme, the interest in preserving the quantum of information would
invalidate any restriction on speech. 34 Similarly, if the rationale of individual
self-fulfillment were absolutely controlling, any expression which could not be
identified with an individual source could not be constitutionally protected.
The view of scholarly authority is that the free exchange of information and
35
the self-fulfillment of the speaker are concurrent first amendment aims.
Accordingly, neither Justice Powell, for the majority, nor Justice White, in
dissent, asserted that the interest that each respectively championed was
exclusive. 36 Both, in fact, cited as support the work of Professor Emerson,
who lists both "attainment of truth" and "individual self fulfillment" among
primary first amendment functions. 37 But these concurrent aims have been
subject to a shift in emphasis. In this regard, Professor Meiklejohn's theory of
first amendment absolutism, 38 which came to prominence during the years of
the Warren Court, 39 remains influential today. The theory in essence states
that the chief aim of the first amendment is to further the self-governing
capacity of the people by promotion of the free circulation of information and
31. "[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market ....
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); see J.S. Mill, On Liberty, in Utilitarianism and Other Writings 141-83 (M. Warnock
ed. 1962).
32. 435 U.S. at 804-05 (White, J., dissenting).
33. "Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S 357, 375 (1927)
men free to develop their faculties .....
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
34. "[T]he First Amendment allows all ideas to be expressed-whether orthodox, popular,
offbeat, or repulsive. I do not think it permissible to draw lines between the 'good' and the 'bad'
and be true to the constitutional mandate to let all ideas alone." Ginzburg v. United States, 383
U.S. 463, 491-92 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
35. E.g., Z. Chaffee, Free Speech in the United States 33 (1946); L. Tribe, American
Constitutional Law § 12-1, at 579 (1978).
36. Justice Powell stated that the societal interest in free circulation of information, especially
in the government sphere, was "at the heart of the First Amendment's protection." 435 U.S. at
776. Justice White noted that self-fulfillment was "what some have considered to be the principal
function of the First Amendment." Id. at 804 (White, J., dissenting).
37. T. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment 4-8 (1966). Although
Emerson lists self-fulfillment first among first amendment interests, he also refers to two other
interests--"Participation in Decision Making" and "Balance Between Stability and Change"which are specific instances of benefits derived from the free interchange of ideas. Id. at 8-1S.
38. See Meiklejohn, supra note 5.
39. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Brennan, The Supreme
Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretationof the First A mendment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 20 (1965).
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opinion, especially about government affairs. 40 The emphasis that this theory
places on the value of information in and of itself has been incorporated into
two recent lines of cases. Commercial speech cases have invalidated restraints
on mere consumer information, regardless of whether a corporation or private
party disseminates it. 41 Similarly, a "right to hear" rationale has been applied
to protect the rights of those
desirous of hearing information, as well as those
42

wishing to disseminate it.
Thus, the majority's approach of looking first to the content of the speech
rather than the identity of the speaker seems consistent with current priorities
among first amendment interests and with recent trends in the case law.
Whether or not the Meiklejohn theory is too limited in its emphasis on the
governmental function of speech, it is clear that promotion of self-government
43
is, as the Court characterized it, "a major purpose" of the first amendment.
Justice White, on the other hand, offers no foundation for his dissenting
observation that "[i]deas which are not a product of individual choice are
entitled to less First Amendment protection." 44 Such a conclusion runs
counter to the thrust of the Meiklejohn theory and the cases applying it.
Furthermore, the excessive dependence of White's approach on an entirely
individual notion of self-fulfillment cannot be harmonized with cases holding
that the speech of voluntary associations is protected. Arguably, the speech of
a voluntary association may enhance the individual member's selfsatisfaction, 45 even though the association and not the individual was the
speaker. Thus, too great an emphasis on individual identity in defining first

40. Meiklejohn, supra note 5, at 255. This theory has been objected to on the grounds that It
is too mechanistic a view of the value of information and places too much stress on the
governmental aim of the first amendment. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-1, at 578
(1978). In fairness, it should be noted that under the Meiklejohn theory, exposure to any and all
ideas, not simply those which are obviously political, increases the self-governing capacity by
enhancing the intelligence, sensitivity, and critical ability of the citizen. Meiklejohn, supra note 5,
at 257. Moreover, Meiklejohn's theory is not entirely "absolute," since he approves of restrictions
on speech that can in no way serve a self-governing function, as in the customary example of
"falsely shouting fire in a theatre." Id. at 258 (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919)).
41. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809 (1975). In these cases, the Court did not even discuss in passing the corporate nature
of the parties asserting free speech interests.
42. See, e.g., Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429
U.S. 167, 175 n.7 (1976) (restriction on the speech of an employee concerning an employment
grievance at a public meeting held impermissible); Lamont ,. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305
(1965) (right to receive communist propaganda may not be burdened by the requirement of an
affirmative request for such material). This rationale may be limited by a factual requirement that
hearers be openly desirous of the information. It is also clear that the right to hear and
commercial speech cases overlap. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976).
43. 435 U.S. at 776 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)) (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 807 (White, J., dissenting).
45. If the interest of individuals in their constitutional rights can be vindicated through
collective organization, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958), It
seems logical to assume that "collective self-fulfillment" may be had through nonindividual
speech. Of course, such reasoning warrants consideration of the rights of dissenters if the
organization is not a voluntary one.
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amendment rights risks an infringement on recognized associational freedoms .46

B. Review of PriorCase Law
Both the Massachusetts court and Mr. Justice White in dissent
the fourteenth amendment distinction between the first amendment
of personal liberty and corporate property. 47 Both felt that the
affecting standard in the Massachusetts
statute afforded sufficient
48

supported
protection
materially
protection

to the corporate speaker.
The Bellotti majority, however, largely resolved the case not on any
identity-based distinction between speakers but upon the broader philosophical consideration that the first amendment should protect an enlarged pool of
information. By declaring the speech to be of the type "indispensable to
decision making in a democracy, '4 9 the Supreme Court was forced to reject
out of hand two identity-based distinctions that it had previously applied to

restrict corporate speech. First, it discarded as "artificial" s0 the fourteenth
amendment distinction between the liberty interests of an individual and the
property interests of a corporate speaker s ' relied upon by Justice White and
the Massachusetts lower court. This rejection seems entirely justifiable because the distinction itself has been gradually eroded. -2 Second, the Court
undertook a discussion of its prior first amendment cases primarily to refute
the argument that the materially affecting standard in the statute in question

46. See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 57, 166-67 (1978).
47. See 435 U.S. at 828 (White, J., dissenting); notes 21-25 supra and accompanying text. The
applicability of the first and fourteenth amendments to the Bellotti case is predicated on two
factors. The first is the incorporation of the first amendment guarantees into the fourteenth
amendment, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). But see First Nat'l Bank v.Bellotti,
435 U.S. at 823 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (limited application of the Bill of Rights to the states
via the fourteenth amendment). The second is the acceptance of a corporation as a person for the
purposes of the fourteenth amendment. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific RLR., 118 U.S.
394 (1886). Although a forceful argument has been made against the inclusion of corporations
within the fourteenth amendment, Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 83
(1938) (Black, J., dissenting), on the ground that the amendment's history made it clear that it
was primarily intended to curtail racial discrimination, see generally Graham, The Conspiracy
Theory of the FourteenthAmendment, 47 Yale L.J. 371 (1938), corporate "personhood" currently
seems well settled. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 780 n.15; id. at 822 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
48. 435 U.S. at 821 n.17 (White, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 777.
50. Id. at 779.
51. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v.
Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906).
52. It has been argued on the basis of an intensive study of corporate fourteenth amendment
cases that the liberty-property distinction is far from precise, notwithstanding the language of
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) and Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs,
203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906). Smith, Business, BuckS & Bull: The Corporation, The First Amendment & The CorruptPracticesLaw, 4 Del. J. Corp. L. 39, 49-76 (1978). For example, Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), applied fourteenth amendment protection to what was essentially
liberty of contract, a concept combining elements of both liberty and the protection of property.
See Smith, supra, at 57-58, 64-65. Furthermore, Pierce itself contains overtones of a " 'liberty'
oriented appeal." Smith, supra, at 65.
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codified the full and proper extent to which corporate free speech had
previously been protected. The attempted refutation is somewhat cursory and
generally unpersuasive. The Court began by admitting that earlier corporate
free speech cases could have been decided under a materially affecting
rationale. 5 3 It then went on to state, however, that the mere absence of
reference to that standard in such earlier decisions constituted support for its
present refusal to adopt such a standard.5 4 The fallacy in the Court's
reasoning is that the question of corporate speech which does in fact deviate
from the materially affecting standard had not reached the Court before
Bellotti. Rather than acknowledging the unprecedented factual circumstances
presented to it in Bellotti, the Court dismissed its opportunity to distinguish
corporate political speech situations from earlier cases in which the speech of
a corporation bore a direct relationship to its business activities.
The Court's reliance upon the quantum of information theory in extending
protection to corporate political speech produced a broadly worded opinion
when alternative narrower grounds were available which would have permitted the Court to protect the speech in Bellotti.5" Simply by noting the
expanded social role of the corporation and the extension of its interests
beyond the "profit motive" and other purely economic matters,5 6 the Court
could have protected corporate advocacy on tax referenda without wholesale
rejection of identity-based distinctions. If the Court perceived the materially
affecting language as too restrictive by virtue of its history of statutory
connotations, it might have used an analytically equivalent device and
required only the need for some connection between the defined functions of a
corporation-broad in light of the rejection in many states of the ultra vires
doctrine- 7-and the speech in which the corporation engages."8 This would
53. 435 U.S. at 781. In earlier cases, for example, the speech of the corporate press did not
merely affect, but rather constituted, the business purpose of such corporations. "In such cases,
the speech would be connected to the corporation's business almost by definition." Id. The
institutional character of the first amendment guarantee covering the press may operate to remove
such corporations from conventional first amendment analysis altogether. See generally Stewart,
"Or of the Press", 26 Hastings L.J. 631 (1975). But see First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at
797-98 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The controversy over the scope of first amendment protection
for the press is beyond the scope of this article. Similarly, the speech of nonprofit, representative
corporations such as the NAACP clearly relates to the social and political purposes for which it Is
chartered. See id. at 825 n.5 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). And, finally, commercial speech Is
"necessarily incidental to the [speaker's] business." Id. at 825 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
54. 435 U.S. at 781.
55. One commentator has suggested that a more narrow holding in Bellotti would have
created greater uncertainty. Fox, CorporatePoliticalSpeech" The Effect of First NationalBank of
Boston v. Bellotti Upon Statutory Limitations on Corporate Referendum Spending, 67 Ky. L.J.
75, 88 n.71 (1979). However, the extensive discussion of Anderson v. City of Boston, Mass.
-,
380 N.E.2d 628 (1978) in part II of this Note will argue that the analytical difficulties faced
by the state court in that decision were in fact the product of the overly broad rationale in
Bellotti.
56. On the issue of the corporation's expanded role in modern society, see Hazen & Buckley,
Models of Corporate Conduct: From the Government Dominated Corporation to the Corporate
Dominated Government, 58 Neb. L. Rev. 100, 103-06 (1978), and authorities cited therein,
57. H. Henn, Handbook of the Law of Corporations § 184, at 352-57 (2d ed. 1970).
58. The Court appeared to reject the possibility of requiring some connection-though a less
stringent one than materially affecting-between the subject of the speech and the corporate
speaker. 435 U.S. at 784.
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restrict corporations to issues in which they have a valid stake and prevent
their encroachment into political candidate elections on the grounds that there
can be no corporate function which would justify advocacy in support of
particular individuals.5 9
Although the Court's quantum of information theory is philosophically
attractive because it opens up the scope of first amendment protection to any
speaker who can provide theoretically useful material to the public, the
approach is not without its problems. Most of these problems spring from the
Court's failure to employ any analytical approach that could serve as a model
for the lower courts. Even though it has discarded both fourteenth amendment and functional grounds for distinguishing the degree of protected speech
on the basis of the speaker's identity, the Court also refused to address the
issues of whether corporations' first amendment rights are coextensive with
individuals', or whether restrictions impermissible when applied to individuals would be acceptable when applied to corporate speakers. 60 The Court
was attempting to disclaim the blanket endorsement effect of its philosophical
position, but because it declined to adhere to the old restrictions or enumerate
new ones, even in dictum, lower courts are left without guidance and will
presumably extend a first amendment protection as broad as that permitted
an individual until the Court has had further opportunity to limit its holding
in Bellotti. And, as Anderson v. City of Boston 6 I aptly illustrates, the lower
courts are reduced to a conclusory extension of first amendment rights and a
new emphasis on compelling state interests to reach the same results that
might have been reached under a narrower identity-based analysis.
C.

Compelling State Interests

The first portion of the Court's opinion addressed the existence of a
corporation's first amendment right to free speech on public affairs, regardless
of whether the topic materially affected its business. Having decided that such
speech was protected, the majority defined two impermissible purposes underlying the Massachusetts statute: its restrictions on who may speak and its
intended effect of equalizing debate by handicapping one side in the expression of its views. 62 The Massachusetts court, having dismissed the idea of
corporate rights of free speech, never reached the issue which the Supreme
Court next resolved: whether the state had a compelling interest that justified
the restriction placed on protected corporate speech. 63 While the lower court
subjected the statute to a mere rational basis standard, 64 the Supreme Court
employed a strict scrutiny standard in light of its initial holding that the
speech involved warranted constitutional protection. 6- Massachusetts pro59. This was precisely the fear of Justice White, who considered that the broad rationale of
the decision rendered precarious the prohibition on corporate contributions to political candidates
embodied in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976). 435 U.S. at 819-21
(White, J., dissenting).
60.

435 U.S. at 777 & n.13.

61. Mass. -,
380 N.E.2d 628 (1978), discussed at pt. II infra.
62. 435 U.S. at 785.
63. Id. at 786.
64. Id. at 787 n.24.
65. Id. at 786.
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posed two compelling interests; in the majority view, neither was sufficient to
justify the statutory restriction.
1. Freedom of Elections
The first argument advanced by Massachusetts in support of its statutory
restriction was the government's interest in regulating and safeguarding the
free election process. Massachusetts claimed that public confidence in government would be promoted by restricting the dissemination of the corporate
viewpoint; it feared that "corporations are wealthy and powerful and their
views may drown out other points of view."'66 The Court rejected this
argument on three grounds. First, the Court pointed to the lack of any
67
showing in the record that corporate advocacy dominated other viewpoints.
Indeed, it doubted that such dominance was even likely because the Court
saw no reason to assume that both large and small corporations would share a
single view on an issue as controversial as tax reform. 68 Second, the particular
facts of the case were stressed. In a candidate election, large corporate
contributions have the potential to foster political corruption through the
creation of a psychological "debt" owing from a candidate or officeholder to a
contributor to his cause. 69 In a referendum, as in Bellotti, however, no
similar potential for individual corruption exists. Moreover, because referenda
concern issues that cannot be resolved simply on the basis of personalities or
along party lines, the need for data upon which citizens may make a more
informed choice is greater. 70 Finally, the Court reasoned that it would be
paternalistic for the government to shield voters from corporate advocacy
simply because it may influence their votes; the first amendment, it was
asserted, presupposes more faith in 71the intelligence and ability of citizens to
evaluate information on its merits.
The dissenting opinion of Justice White disputed both the philosophical
position and factual conclusions of the majority. Corporations, he contended,
were endowed by the state with special advantages for economic reasons, and,
as a result, they have come to control great economic resources. The state is
under no obligation, however, to allow the entity that it has created to
overwhelm the democratic process. 72 In response to the majority's contention
that the statute impermissibly seeks to equalize debate, White conceived of
the restriction as simply insuring that the advantages the state has granted to
73
the corporation do not operate unfairly.
66. Id. at 789.

67. Id. The Court noted, however, that had such a showing been made, "these arguments
would merit our consideration." Id.
68. Id. at 785 n.22.
69. Id. at 788 n.26, 790.
70. Id. at 790 & n.29. Much the same reasoning lay behind the Second Circuit's holding that
corporate expenditure on a referendum issue was not barred as a "political purpose" under a New
York statute. Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844, 848 (2d. Cir. 1974). See generally 1975 B.Y.U.
L. Rev. 235.
71. 435 U.S. at 791-92. It was strongly suggested that the source of corporate advocacy
should be identified, so that its merits could be more effectively weighed. Id. at 792 n.32.
72. Id. at 809 (White, J., dissenting).
73. Id. The majority was justly critical of White's somewhat archaic rationale that the
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Moreover, Justice White believed that the factual findings convincingly
show corporate domination of the electoral process. Although the majority
admitted the theoretical possibility of inordinate corporate influence, White
noted that it ignored Massachusetts' showing, typical of other states, that in
the referendum prior to the statutory restriction, a corporate-sponsored politi74
cal committee spent seventeen times the amount raised by the opposition.
The dissent's reaction to this evidence of corporate influence seems to stand on
firm ground. Although the majority regards as incomplete the Massachusetts
75
figures as to the margin by which corporations outspend their opponents,
the figures seem nonetheless to present a reasonably accurate picture of
corporate activity. Arguably, some nominally individual contributions, such
as "suggested" contributions from corporate officials, in fact emanate from
corporate sources, and thus indicate a pervasive corporate influence exceeding
reported expenditures. 76 When, as here, the facts are unsettled, judicial
restraint would seem to require that the Court defer to the legislative
77
factfinding ability of the state of Massachusetts.
Even in the face of these figures that support Justice White's reservations
about corporate dominance, however, the majority's antipaternalism argument is probably more decisive in a referendum context. Justice Powell's
opinion alluded to the "sovereign capacity" of the people that is exercised in a
referendum. 78 Through this democratic device, the ultimate responsibility for
decision lies with the citizens themselves. 7 9 Especially when the authoritative
will of the people is exercised directly and not representatively, it would seem
that the ability of the people to judge rightly, even in the face of corporate
advocacy, must be presumed. "[I]f there be any danger that the people cannot
privileges which a state has granted to a corporation may simply be rescinded by the state.
White's use of this charter-type argument would contravene the line of cases recognizing
commercial speech protections absent any express or implied state authorization. See, e.g.,
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). Furthermore, under a strict adherence
to this theory, states would have no power to restrain the speech of the federally chartered banks
which were plaintiffs in Bellotti. 435 U.S. at 778 n.14. On the other hand, Justice White's
argument that a greater degree of regulation of institutional rather than individual activities is
permissible finds support in United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), where the Court held
that a personal constitutional right, such as the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination,
could not be claimed by an organization which embodies "common or group interests only." Id.
at 701. In that case, the organization involved was a labor union; insofar as a corporation can be
analogized to a union as a collective group, the majority's unwillingness to make distinctions on
the basis of identity runs counter to earlier case law.
74. 435 U.S. at 810-11 (White, J., dissenting).
75. The majority noted that corporate contributions are reported only if made to established
committees. Id. at 789 n.28.
76. E. Epstein, The Corporation in American Politics 95 (1969).
77. "[The Court] nowhere explains why it is entitled to substitute its judgment for that of
Massachusetts and other States..." as to the evidentiary fact of corporate influence. 435 U.S. at
811 (White, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 791 n.31.
79. "[A referendum] is the city itself legislating through its voters-an exercise by the voters of
their traditional right through direct legislation to override the views of their elected representatives as to what serves the public interest." City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426
U.S. 668, 678 (1976) (quoting Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City,
424 F.2d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1970)).
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evaluate the information and arguments . . . it is a danger contemplated by

the Framers of the First Amendment. ' 80 Indeed, the sovereignty of the people
is such that, were the electorate to adopt the favored corporate position in its
impossible for the government to argue that the people
entirety, it would be
81
have been misled.
2.

Rights of Dissenting Shareholders

Thomas Jefferson stated that "to compel a man to furnish contributions of
money for the propagation of opinion which he disbelieves, is sinful and
tyrannical." 82 In the corporate context, however, the Bellotti majority was
unresponsive to the argument that Massachusetts had a legitimate state
interest in the protection of corporate shareholders who may dissent from
corporate advocacy that they find objectionable. The Court characterized the
statute as both under- and over-inclusive as to the shareholder protection
rationale, which thereby "belied" the possibility that shareholder protection
was its purpose. 83 More importantly, the Court intimated that a dissenting
shareholder must resort largely to "self-help" measures if he should find
himself in disagreement with the corporate position: he may either sell his
stock and disassociate himself completely from the corporation, or he may
seek to control the corporation's speech through the processes of corporate
democracy. 84 The Court reasoned that the element of compulsion was lacking
when the retention of corporate shares is entirely a matter of free choice. 85
Justice White pointed out in his dissent that corporate advocacy could be
nothing more than the views of corporate management, financed by the
investment of all shareholders, whether or not they individually agreed with
those views.8 6 White noted that the first amendment protects the right to
dissent from objectionable views. 87 He analogized the case to Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education,8 8 in which the Court held that nonunion
80. 435 U.S. at 792.
81. "The will of the people is the only legitimate foundation of any government, and to
protect its free expression should be our first object." 4 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 379 (A.
Lipscomb & A. Bergh eds. 1903). Notably, Massachusetts voters rejected income tax proposals
both in the presence and absence of corporate advocacy. 435 U.S. at 789 n.28.
82. I. Brant, James Madison: The Nationalist 354 (1948), quoted in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 n.31 (1977).
83. The Court concluded that the statute was underinclusive because its application was
limited to corporations and did not extend to labor unions, trusts, and other aggregations of
people where similar dissenting interests might arise. Similarly, only one form of corporate
activity susceptible to dissent, advocacy concerning a referendum, was prohibited. Corporate
lobbying activities, for instance, would not be affected. 435 U.S. at 793. The statute was
overinclusive in the sense that corporate expenditure would be banned even if shareholders gave
their unanimous approval to corporate advocacy. 1d. at 794.
84. Id. at 794-95.
85. Id. at 794 n.34.
86. See id. at 806 (White, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 813 (citing West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)). In
Barnette, the Court held that a regulation promulgated by a local school board requiring students
and teachers to participate in a daily flag salute was an unconstitutional infringement of the right
to abstain from activities that run counter to ideological beliefs.
88. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).

1979]

MUNICIPAL FREE SPEECH

1123

teachers, represented by a union under a state-authorized agency shop agreement, suffered an infringement of their first amendment rights when their
union dues were diverted from defraying the costs of representation to support
of political activity to which they objected. 89 Moreover, White noted that if
corporate advocacy were to become widespread, investment decisions might
come to be governed as much by ideological as economic considerations.9"
Working under the assumptions that corporations are created by the state in
order to promote economic growth, and that investment decisions burdened
by noneconomic considerations are inefficient, 9 ' White contended that the
statute's materially affecting language was nothing more than a reasonable
measure calculated to preserve economic stability. 92 The protection afforded
the dissenting shareholder was felt to be all the more reasonable by virtue of
the continued availability of the public forum to corporate directors and
officers willing to express their views at personal rather than corporate
93
expense.
In his discussion of the effect of burdening the exercise of recognized rights,
Justice White demonstrated the shortcomings of the majority's minimizing
approach to defining compulsion of dissenters. It is questionable whether, as
the majority suggests, Bellotti is simply analogous to joining a union voluntarily and later finding oneself in disagreement with its political ideas while
remaining free to withdraw in order to avoid supporting the propagation of
such ideas. 94 White points to the state authorized agency shop agreement in
Abood, observing that the employees remained free to quit their jobs and seek
other employment to avoid giving their financial support to union political
activity. Thus, remaining in the union was entirely voluntary, but abandoning one's existing employment constituted an intolerable burden. 9" Wooley v.
89. Id. at 211-14. Legislation expressly permitting a union shop has been construed to
recognize this protection. See International Ass'n of ,Machinists v. Street. 367 U.S 740 (19b1h
Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson. 351 U.S. 225 (1956)1 Abood provided a constitutional
framework for this protection beyond mere statutory construction
90. 435 U.S. at 818-19 (White. J., dissenting).
91- Cf. A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations 423 (E. Cannan ed. 1937) (the individual's pursuit
of profit in his investments leads, through the operation of the invisible hand of the market, to the
economic health of the state).
92. 435 U.S. at 818-19 (White. J., dissenting). It is the very lack of a business purpose in
corporate advocacy unrelated to matters "materially affecting" the corporation which bnngs the
interest of dissenter protection into consideration. The majority argued that minority shareholders
are routinely compelled to submit to the direction of the majority in many matters of corporate
policy, therefore belying the notion that ideological concerns were a substantial economic factor.
Id. at 794 n.34. Justice White responded that shareholders agree to submit to majority rule as to
business matters, but do not thereby sacrifice first amendment interests in nonbusiness. ideological concerns. Id. at 816 (White. J., dissenting). This dissenting view seems correct While
shareholder consent to the procedures of corporate self-government can be implied as to business
matters, no such tacit acquiesence exists as to political or social matters. Such matters are
probably not perceived as part of the individual's investment purpose A., White note., this
distinction between business matters and ideological concerns has been made in 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8(c)(5) (1977). which provides that proxy statements need not include shareholder
proposals relating to matters "not significantly related to [corporate] business."
93. 435 U.S. at 807 (White, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 794 n.34.
95. Id. at 818 (White, J., dissenting). The Justices also disagreed as to the importance of state

1124

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

Maynard96 also supports White's equating of the burdening of first amendment rights and coercion. There, the defendant removed a state slogan that he
found objectionable from his license plate; defendant's right to do so was
based on his "refus[al] to be coerced."' 97 The Court held that the defendant
could not be forced to abandon driving in order to avoid a penalty for not
displaying the slogan. By acknowledging that driving is "a virtual necessity,"9 it implied that defendant's first amendment right not to speak, that is,
not to display the message, would be greatly burdened. Thus, the Bellotti
majority's bare assertion that "no shareholder has been 'compelled' "99 is
incomplete insofar as it fails to address the burdensome requirement which
the outcome of Beotti imposes-namely, the necessity that investors sacrifice
otherwise economically attractive opportunities in order to avoid supporting
corporate ideological positions. 100
Perhaps it was not incumbent upon the Court to do more than decide the
precise issue presented by Bellotti. If so, the Court appears to have reached a
justifiable result, given the strong social interest in information pertaining to
government affairs. But justifiable or not, the result was reached in a way
which failed adequately to distinguish the case from precedent and which
indicated no guidelines with which other courts might apply Bellotti's expansive rationale. As such, the uncertainty that such a decision would predictably
cause was shortly made manifest.

II.

MUNICIPAL FREE SPEECH

Bellotti was well received by the business community, which anticipated
that the decision would promote intensified corporate advocacy in two major
areas. First, appeals to the public were expected concerning the effect of
widespread government regulation of business,' 0 ' presumably advocating the
repeal of such regulations by emphasizing the costs of compliance that are
passed on to the consumer. Second, an attack on the federal regulation of
corporate contributions to political candidates was anticipated. 10 2 In at least
one state-Massachusetts-and in regard to at least one nationally important
issue-taxation-the decision provided the impetus for a corporate publicity

action in Bellotti. The majority noted that private corporations alone were involved. Id. at 794
n.34. Justice White maintained that "the States have always been free to adopt measures designed
to further rights protected by the Constitution even when not compelled to do so." Id. at 814
(White, J., dissenting).
96. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
97. Id. at 713.
98. Id. at 715. Of course, the degree of coercion was great in Wooley because exhibition of the

license was required by a state statute with criminal penalties for noncompliance.
99.

435 U.S. at 794 n.34.

100. Id. at 818 (White, J., dissenting); cf. Community Serv. Broadcasting v. FCC, 4 Med. L.
Rep. 1257, 1266-69 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 25, 1978) (FCC requirement that broadcasters tape public
interest programs held to burden and "chill" exercise of first amendment rights).
101. U.S. News & World Report, May 8, 1978, at 91, col. 1.
102. Id.; see note 59 supra and accompanying text.
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campaign 10 3 urging the defeat of 04a referendum proposal, giving rise in turn,
to Anderson v. City of Boston.1
A.

Anderson v. City of Boston

As the history of Bellotti indicates, Massachusetts voters had repeatedly
rejected income tax reform referenda.'0 5 Property taxation became the subject
of a similar referendum following a Supreme Judicial Court decision mandating the use of 100% valuation in the assessment of real estate for tax
purposes. 10 6 The 100% valuation scheme would have doubled tax levies on
homeowners, causing particular concern in urban areas, where a severe
impact on low income residents was feared.' 0 7 To alleviate the burden on
homeowners, the legislature proposed an amendment to the Massachusetts
constitution designed to allow the taxation of residential property at a lower
rate. The proposal was made the subject of a referendum in 1978.108
Boston's Mayor Kevin White took the lead in supporting the proposed
amendment, partially in response to an extensive campaign of opposition
financed by corporate contributions. 10 9 At his instigation, an ordinance authorizing the city to expend funds in connection with the referendum was
approved by the city council. The city's program of support for the amendment took three forms. First, the city established and funded an Office of
Public Information on Classification "for the purpose of collecting and disseminating information about the impact of 100% valuation." 100 For example,
pamphlets explaining the effect of the proposed amendment were printed and
distributed at the city's expense,"1 although the name or photograph of any
city official was banned from such promotional material. 12 Second, the Office
of Public Information enlisted the support of citizen volunteers in the cam1 13
paign, providing them with the use of city offices and telephones at no cost.

103. See Ulman, A FamiliarRing: Boston Demands Free Speech Rights, Wall St. J., Oct. 27,
1978, at 22, col. 3. The corporate spending was effected through contribution to the quasipolitical Committee Against Property Tax Discrimination. At least two of the corporate contributors, First National Bank of Boston and the Gillette Company, had been parties to the
Bellotti litigation. 435 U.S. at 768 n.1.
104.

-

Mass. -,

380 N.E.2d 628 (1978).

105. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
106. Town of Sudbury v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 366 Mass. 558, 321 N.E.2d
641 (1974).
107. Affidavit of Mayor Kevin H. White at 5, City of Boston v. Anderson, 99 S. Ct. 50
(1978).
Mass. -, 380 N.E.2d
108. Agreed Statement of Facts at 2, Anderson v. City of Boston, 628 (1978).
109. Passage of the amendment would have shifted the increased share of tax liability from
homeowners to business and industry. Ulman, supra note 103, at 22, col. 3.
110. Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 108, at 4.
111. Appellees' Opposition to Application for Stay of Mandate, app. C. City of Boston v.
Anderson, 99 S. Ct. 346 (1978).
112. Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 108, Attachment A, § 2.
113. Id. at 4.
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City employees staffed the Office "as part of their official duties."' 14 Third,
Boston, together with other cities, contributed a proportionate share of funds
toward a campaign of support organized by the Massachusetts Mayors'
Association. 115

Barely two weeks after the authorization of the program, eleven Boston
taxpayers" 16 filed a suit seeking an injunction against the expenditure of city
funds in this way. 11 7 In light of the approaching date of the referendum, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court heard the case on an expedited basis;
an order was promptly entered enjoining the city's expenditure, with the full
opinion of the court appearing later. 118
As has been characteristic of those rare cases similar to Boston,' 1 9 the court
first examined the state statutory scheme of municipal corporations to determine whether the city had authority to expend funds to influence a referendum vote. It held that such an appropriation was not within the express scope
of municipal authority as defined by state law.1 20 Although Massachusetts'
"Home Rule Amendment" authorized the exercise of municipal power for
purposes not inconsistent with the state constitution or its general laws, the
court reasoned that the extensive state regulation of elections manifests a
legislative intent to preclude the type of municipal intrusion into the electoral
process which Boston's ordinance created.' 2' Noting that cities had traditionally not expended money for political advocacy of this kind, the court
considered the legislature's failure to mention municipalities in the regulatory
scheme evidence that it simply had not conceived of the possibility of such
action taking place, 122 rather than an attempt to exempt municipalities from
this regulation. Therefore, Boston's use of city funds was effectively preempt2 3
ed by the state law.'

114. Id. To assist the program of the Office on Classification, the city contracted with two
private consulting firms to provide information concerning public awareness of the issues and to
train the citizen volunteers in the techniques of effective persuasion. Id. at 6.
115. Id. The amount of Boston's contribution was $112,500. The assessment was made
through a pro-rated, population-based formula.
116. The taxpayers have been identified as members of Boston's business community. Sethi,
Let Shareholders Vote on Corporate "Free Speech," Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1979, at 10, col. 3.
117. Anderson v. City of Boston, Mass ....
380 N.E.2d 628, 631 (1978).
118. Id.at -, 380 N.E.2d at 632.
119. See, e.g., Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds v. Board of Educ., 13 N.J, 172, 179, 98 A.2d
673, 676 (1953), discussed at pt. 11(B) infra.
120. Mass. at -,
380 N.E.2d at 632.
121. Id. at -,
380 N.E.2d at 633-34.
122. Id. at __, 380 N.E.2d at 634.
123. Id. That such city spending was inconsistent with state law was further supported by
state provisions closely regulating the activity of municipal officers in regard to money spent for
political purposes. Although designed to control money collected from private sources, these
regulations would apply equally to money supplied by the city itself, because these regulations
were intended to keep separate the duties of city officials and their partisan political efforts. Id.
The court's conclusion was not affected by a recent legislative enactment requiring the reporting
and disclosure of city expenditures made in connection with referenda, but which expressly
refrained from authorizing them. Id. at -,
380 N.E.2d at 635. Furthermore, the practice of
municipal lobbying was distinguished as having traditional and express statutory foundation. Id.
at -,
380 N.E.2d at 635 n.11.
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The more important portion of the court's opinion treated the city's claim of
first amendment protection for communication relating to a political issue.
The court acknowledged a general lack of case law on the subject of
government speech of this type. 124 The city argued, on the strength of the
majority opinion in Bellotti, that information concerning a matter of vital
public importance deserved protection regardless of its source.1' 5 The Supreme Judicial Court, which was reversed in Bellotti, obviously took pains to
conform to the Supreme Court's analysis. Adopting the Bellotti majority's
approach, the court asked whether protected speech was involved, rather
than whether a city has first amendment rights. 12 6 Although expressing grave
doubt whether the first amendment was applicable to the intrastate question
of a state government's prohibition on the speech of its municipalities, the
court assumed for the purpose of its opinion that protected speech was at issue
without dwelling on the speaker's identity.' 27 Nevertheless, the court held
that compelling state interests justified the state's prohibition of Boston's
28
speech by withholding authorization for these municipal expenditures.'
The first state interest discussed by the court was maintenance of fair and
free elections. It noted that the state law provided carefully drawn provisions
for controlling the supply of information in referenda which required that
copies of majority and minority reports, and concise statements of advantages
and disadvantages, be sent to each voter. The court reasoned that the state
may, as a logical corollary, prohibit municipal interference with such a
precisely balanced scheme.' 29 In addition, the court stated: "[The state] may
further decide that the State government and its various subdivisions should
not use public funds to instruct the people, the ultimate authority, how they
130
should vote."'
The court also found that the state had a second compelling interest in the
protection of dissenting taxpayers. The court recognized the authority of
Buckley v. Valeo, 13 1 in which the Supreme Court held that expenditure of
funds for a political campaign by a candidate himself and political contributions by others enjoyed at least limited protection. 32 It questioned, however,
whether public funds acquired from taxpayers were a legitimate source of
financial support for the speech of a government body." 33 In contrast to
Bellotti, Boston's dissenting taxpayers could not avoid paying the real estate
124.
125.
(1978).
126.

Id. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 635 n.12.
Defendants' Brief at 11,Anderson v. City of Boston,
-

Mass. at -,

-

Mass.

-,

380 N E.2d 628

380 N.E.2d at 636-37.

127. Id. at -,
380 N.E.2d at 637-38.
128. Id.
129. Id. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 638-39. The reasoning seems simply to be an extension of the
argument that the state statutory scheme of election regulation precludes municipal action in the
same sphere. See notes 120-23 supra and accompanying text.
130. lass. at
, 380 N.E.2d at 639. See also id.at -,
380 NE.2d at 639 n.16.
131.

424 U.S. 1 (1976).

132. Id. at 19.
133. Mass. at-_ n.15, 380 N.E.2d at 637 n.15. The court observed that the source of
the funds utilized as "speech" was not at issue in Buckley, and went on to remark that, "Islurely,
the First Amendment does not justify the stealing of funds . . . because the defendant was
planning to use [them] . . . to publish his views on a subject of public concern." Id.
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13 4
taxes which supplied the funds for the city's campaign of advocacy.
Therefore, coercion, lacking with respect to the dissenting shareholders in
Bellotti, is present when the tax laws effectively compel city residents to
135
support the city's view.
Turning to the appropriate remedy, the court reasoned that striking down
the entire city program of expenditure was a more effective means of
protecting dissenters than the alternative of allowing proportional rebates of
tax funds to citizens who declare their opposition to the program. 36 Accordingly, the court confirmed its order enjoining the 137
city from expending additional funds in connection with the referendum.
Boston reached the Supreme Court on an application to the Circuit Justice,
Justice Brennan, for a stay of the Supreme Judicial Court's order. The stay
was granted, allowing Boston to expend the funds.' 38 Justice Brennan
expressed the view that enforcement of the injunction would have permanently denied the city the opportunity to counterbalance the information being
supplied, with Bellotti's authorization, by the amendment's corporate opponents. 1 39 A motion to vacate the stay order was denied,1 40 with three Justices
dissenting. They reasoned that the first amendment did not apply to the claim
of a state subdivision against the state that created it, and thus no federal
question was presented. 41 The referendum was held, and the amendment
passed overwhelmingly.' 42 A subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court was
dismissed for lack of a substantial
federal question, although three Justices
143
noted probable jurisdiction.
Although in the view of the Supreme Court a constitutional question is not
raised when the essence of a city's claim is the mere failure of its chartering
body, the parent state, to endow it expressly with the power of political
speech, the question seems likely to arise in other contexts. Three Justices
noted that "[federal] questions may also arise if a State authorizes expenditures to advance or explain a particular point of view.' 44 A state might itself
speak directly on such political issues, or might specifically authorize a
municipality to do so. Further, at least one court has found an implied
municipal power to speak on public issues. 145 Although the party asserting

134.
135.
136.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

-,
-,
-

380 N.E.2d at 639.
380 N.E.2d at 640 & n.19.
n.20, 380 N.E.2d at 640 n.20.

137. The court declined to set specific guidelines foT the conduct of city employees. It
recognized that city employees have first amendment rights outside the context of their jobs, and
the court did not want to risk infringement of those rights by an overly broad injunction. Id. at
-,
380 N.E.2d at 641. The court also refused to discuss how city facilities were to be used
because the record was unclear as to the extent to which city facilities had been utilized in the
campaign. Id.
138. City of Boston v. Anderson, 99 S. Ct. 50 (1978) (Brennan, Circuit Justice).
139. Id. at 51.
140. City of Boston v. Anderson, 99 S. Ct. 346 (1978).
141. Id. at 347 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907)).
142. Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1978, at 4, col. 1.
143. City of Boston v. Anderson, 99 S. Ct. 822 (1979). Justice Powell, author of the majority
opinion in Bellotti, was one of the Justices who voted to hear the case.
144. City of Boston v. Anderson, 99 S. Ct. 346, 347 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145. City Affairs Comm. v. Board of Comm'rs, 134 N.J.L. 180, 46 A.2d 425 (1946), discussed
at notes 161-65 infra and accompanying text.

19791

MUNICIPAL FREE SPEECH

1129

the right of free speech might differ, the constitutional issue would still be
present. In such case, a state subdivision would not be asserting the right to
speak in the face of state restriction, as in Boston. Because the state or its
subdivision would be an authorized speaker, the focus of the constitutional
claim would likely shift to a dissenter's opposition to being compelled to
support the authorized speech of the government body.
B. Review of PriorCase Law
As the Massachusetts court noted in Boston, the various state cases
addressing the issue of municipal appropriation of funds for political activity
provide little guidance. 46 These cases, however, have been almost unanimously sympathetic to the contention of taxpayers that such expenditures are
invalid. The governing rationale of these cases has undergone an evolution.
Elsenau v. City of Chicago14 7 is representative of an early cluster of cases. A
resident taxpayer of the city sought an injunction against the payment of
municipal funds commissioned by the city in support of a bond issue in an
upcoming election. 148 In holding the expenditure unauthorized, the court
focused almost exclusively on the inherent limitations of municipal power: as
a creation of its parent state, the city's powers are to be strictly construed, and
any implied power must be intimately related to express statutory authority.14 9 As a result, expenditures must be for a "corporate purpose," that is, a

"purpose which is germane to the objects for which the corporation was
created." 150 When a city expends money for advertising which is partisan,
and not merely informative, the court ruled that no statutory municipal
function was served, that therefore no corporate purpose existed, and that the
appropriation was improper.' 5'
The reasoning of Elsenau is somewhat circular. The court argued that the
city's expenditure failed to constitute a "corporate purpose" because it failed
to fulfill a municipal function, but failed to clarify in what respect a
"municipal function" was lacking. The decision simply avoided any analysis
of the manner in which the city's action distorted the role of government.
Citizens to Protect Public Funds v. Board of Education 52 subsequently
provided a more explicit rationale. In a case involving a school district's
expenditures in support of school budget approval, Justice Brennan, then of
the Supreme Court of New Jersey, wrote that while the power to expend
money to inform was necessary, 153 when only one side of the issue was
favored by public funds, "simple fairness and justice to the rights of dissenters
require that the use by public bodies of public funds for advocacy be
Mass. at -,
380 N.E.2d at 635.
147. 334 Ill.
78, 165 N.E. 129 (1929).
148. Id. at 79, 165 N.E. at 130. The expenditure had been authorized by a city council
ordinance. Id.
149. Id. at 81, 165 N.E. at 130.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 81-82, 165 N.E. at 130-31; see State ex rel. Port of Seattle v. Superior Court, 93
Wash. 267, 160 P. 755 (1916) (use of tax funds by port district for advocacy urging repeal of
legislation by referendum vote held invalid).
152. 13 N.J. 172, 98 A.2d 673 (1953).
153. Id. at 179-80, 98 A.2d at 676-77.
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restrained . . .in the absence of a legislative grant in express terms of the
15 4
broader power."'

Two more recent cases argue a more expansive reason for the impropriety
of government advocacy expenditures. In Stern v. Kramarsky,1S5 a New York
court dealt with a State Division of Human Rights campaign in support of the
equal rights amendment. While acknowledging a government duty to supply
information, the court characterized one-sided government speech as potentially dangerous "propaganda," and suggested that such use of public funds,
supplied by citizens of diverse views, contravened basic democratic principles. -15 6 In Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Denver School District
#1,1 7 a federal court went even further in considering a state statute
authorizing a school board to "make contributions... in campaigns involving
only issues in which they have an official concern."' 5 8 The court held that the
statute, construed narrowly, did not authorize the school board to expend
funds in an effort to defeat a proposed constitutional amendment on the
subject of government spending. The court noted, however, that a school
bond issue would constitute a matter of "official concern."' s 9 The court
remarked that government partisanship, appearing in opposition to an effort
by citizens to improve their government through the amendment process,
abridged first amendment rights, and might also be considered repugnant
to
60
the constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government.'
Only one case has upheld the right of a municipality to employ public funds
1 61
for advocacy. City Affairs Committee v. Board of Commissioners
involved
Jersey City's opposition to a state constitutional amendment which would
have granted significant tax advantages to railroads. Advertising urging the
defeat of the amendment was financed by the city. The court refused to strike
the expenditure; because the resulting loss of tax revenue would have been
inimical to the city's interest, the city's advocacy in favor of its defeat served a
"public purpose.' 62 A strong dissent perceived government advocacy as
disturbing the delicate process of representative government by effectively
allowing the government to direct the governed, rather than vice versa.1 63
Subsequently, the case was limited by Justice Brennan's opinion in Citizens, 164
although a concurring opinion characterized the view of the school board
154. Id. at 182, 98 A.2d at 678; accord, Porter v. Tiffany, 11 Or. App. 542, 502 P.2d 1385
(1972) (bond issue concerning nuclear power; expenditure included television and radio ads);
Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976) (bond issue for parks
acquisition); see Mines v. Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 257 P. 530 (1927) (suggesting a rationale

similar to that of Justice Brennan).
155. 84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
156. Id. at 452, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 239-40; see Stewart v. Scheinert, 84 Misc, 2d 672, 374
N.Y.S.2d 585 (Sup. Ct. 1975), affd, 52 A.D.2d 636, 382 N.Y.S.2d 558 (2d Dep't 1976).

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

459 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1978).
Id. at 359.
Id.
Id. at 361.
134 N.J.L. 180, 46 A.2d 425 (1946).
Id. at 181-82, 46 A.2d at 427.
Id. at 191-92, 46 A.2d at 431-32 (Colie, J., dissenting).
13 N.J. at 182, 98 A.2d at 678, discussed at notes 152-54 supra and accompanying text.
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which should constitute part of the information
as an "experienced judgment"
65
available to the voters.1
Thus, with the exception of one decision, subsequently limited by the same
court that decided it, the case law on the question of local government speech
has been uniform in its rejection of a right of advocacy in connection with
elections. Perhaps because government subdivisions are increasingly perceived as "governments" in their own right, that is, as governments unconnected to the state authorization on which they depend, the reasoning of the
courts has moved away from a limited inquiry into the boundaries of a city's
delegated powers. The more expansive rationale that has replaced such an
inquiry suggests that the use of public funds by a city to embroil itself in
political controversy is inherently unjustified. In fact, the most recent cases
seem to imply that the express legislative authorization of municipal advocacy
that would have satisfied the courts in earlier cases would now be insufficient
to justify these expenditures. Thus, Boston's activities, undertaken in the face
of such increasingly negative court reaction, and the disposition of the case by
the Supreme Court which permitted the city's expenditures, warrant close
examination.
C. Analvsis
The Supreme Judicial Court displayed obvious discomfort at the constraints
that the Bellotti decision placed on its approach in Boston. The court
complied with the Bellotti analysis and assumed that the speech involved was
protected. Nevertheless, it suggested that a distinction as to the identity of the
speaker was warranted. "[W]e suspect that the First Amendment has nothing
to do with this intra-state question of the rights of a political subdivision...
no matter how important the topic desired to be placed under discussion
.. .. ,166 Three Supreme Court Justices expressed the same reservations when
considering the stay of mandate in the case. 1 67 Although Bellotti did acknowledge that some distinctions as to identity might exist, its emphasis on
68
information and consequent failure to deal with the identity issue1 seems to
have imposed as inefficient and "artificial" a mode of analysis on nonindividual first amendment cases as the fourteenth amendment liberty-property
distinction that the Court itself rejected in the same case.
There are two aspects of nonindividual speech to which first amendment
analysis may be appropriately applied. The first of these is the impact of the
information on the hearers. Because the quantum of information theory used
by the Court in Bellotti made the informative nature of speech essentially
dispositive,1 69 it is important to examine this aspect of government speech
first. Boston will be distinguished, however, on the ground that the informative value of the speech of the government is severely undermined by its
propensity to prejudice, to confuse, and to hamper its hearers in the exercise
of self-government. Discussion of a second aspect of nonindividual speech165.
166.

167.
168.
169.

Id. at 184, 98 A.2d at 679 (Heher. J..concurring).
Mass. at -, 380 N.E.2d at 637.
City of Boston v. Anderson, 99 S. Ct. 346, 347 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See notes 55-60 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 43, 49 supra and accompanying text.
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that it is necessarily financed by a group of people, all of whom may not be in
accord with its message-will be deferred.' 0 Such use of public funds to
support partisan positions constitutes an affront to the first amendment rights
of those who dissent from the government view, and also represents a greater
degree of coercion than was present in Bellotti.
1. The Effect of Government Speech on Its Hearers
Ironically, under the pure quantum of information approach, what would
be commonly regarded as the objectionable feature of Boston's program of
communication with the voters-its partisan character, its advocacy of only
one side of a public issue-must initially be discounted. Given Bellotti's firm
reliance on the ability of the hearers to evaluate the arguments presented,
there can be no significance attributed to the distinction between the painstakingly nonpartisan supply of information required of the state of Massachusetts17 1 and the city's campaign in support of one view. Purely as a matter of
content, Bellotti protects Boston's partisan speech because, under the Court's
mode of reasoning, the mere fact that a certain type of speech is designed to
convince is no justification for its suppression. 72 The first amendment
"'protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing.' 73
But where the identity of the speaker combines with the partisan content of
the speech, a different question is presented. The Bellotti Court itself noted
that a corporation may be required to identify itself in its speech in order to
enable voters to evaluate the merits of the arguments in light of the identity of
the speaker. 174 Assuming that this same requirement of identification applies
to government speech, 175 it is questionable whether the impact on the voter of
knowing the source of such advocacy is the same in both instances. For
example, a voter may cautiously assess the argument of a corporation in the
light of what he believes the corporation's motives and hidden interests to be.
A voter is likely to be entirely confused, however, when confronted with an
indication from the government as to how he, the voter, ought to direct that
government to act. The government's motive is obscure. While there is a
settled expectation, drawn from experience, that corporations will speak in
order to promote their economic goals, directly or indirectly, no such expectation attaches to the speech of a government body because a government's
functions are less clearly defined than the profit-making function that guides
corporate decisions. It is uncertain whether a government speaks in the
interest of promoting the welfare of the governed, or as the representative of a
majority of its constituents, or simply to inform citizens of the views of their
170.

See pt. III (C)(2) infra.

171.

See -

172.
173.

Mass. at -,
380 N.E.2d at 638.
435 U.S. at 790.
Id. (quoting Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of New York, 360

U.S. 684, 689 (1959)).

174. 435 U.S. at 792 n.32.
175. The City of Boston was identified as the source of its promotional material. Appellees'
Opposition to Application for Stay of Mandate, app. C, City of Boston v. Anderson, 99 S. Ct.
346 (1978).
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elected officials. Because advocacy does not simply convey 176
information, but
also seeks to persuade, it is likely to generate confusion.
Government motivation requires consideration of two related issues called
directly into question by Bellotti, both of which argue for the restriction of
government speech. The first of these is the concept of paternalism. Bellotti
regarded the state's restriction of the type of information that could be made
available to voters as evidence of a paternalistic attitude, one which presumed
to protect the voters from too overwhelming an influence on their decision.1 77
But by acting not just to restrict the available information, but also to proffer
its own view of how citizens should vote, the government presumes little faith
in the citizens' abilities. Second, the Bellotti opinion noted that the government "has a special incentive to repress opposition and often wields a more
effective power of suppression."' 78 Such a statement recognizes the ever
present possibility of government advocacy motivated by the worst of reasons,
the self-perpetuation of the present government in power.1 7 9 Such a motive
may well arise in the context of a referendum that challenges established
methods of government that the present bureaucracy may be unwilling to
relinquish. 180
176. It has been argued that the prohibition of municipal advocacy would risk a "chilling
effect" on the dissemination of nonpartisan information because of the difficulty of distinguishing
communication which seeks merely to inform from that which seeks to persuade. Jurisdictional
Statement at 25-26, City of Boston v. Anderson, 99 S. Ct. 50 (1978). It is true that courts should
be cautious in categorizing government communicative activities as advocacy. There is a danger
that information necessary for public decisionmaking could be lost simply because opponents of a
particular measure might label facts disclosed by government as "incomplete" and therefore
"partisan." However, there is a crucial distinction: even information so presented as to make the
desired conclusion almost irresistible remains impartial in that it recognizes that the final critical
judgment must be supplied by those to whom the information is addressed. Express advocacy
tends to supplant the critical capacity of its hearers, and it is this tendency that invalidates
partisan government advocacy. The Supreme Court acknowledged a similar distinction in
construing a proposed election law regulation limiting expenditures "relative to" a candidate. The
limitation was restricted to the financing of express advocacy only. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
39-44 & n.52 (1976) (listing as examples of such advocacy "vote for," "elect," "support," "defeat,"
and "reject"). Moreover, some dissemination of information may take on the character of
advocacy because of the context in which it is made available. Although certain parts of Boston's
overall campaign in support of the amendment arguably had a valid informative function, see
Appellees' Opposition to Application for Stay of Mandate, app. C, City of Boston v. Anderson,
99 S. Ct. 346 (1978), they must be read in the context of an entire program designed to "speak
militantly about a referendum issue." Anderson v. City of Boston, Mass. at -, 380 N.E.2d
at 637.
177. 435 U.S. at 791 n.31.
178. Id. at 777 n.11 (quoting T. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment
9 (1966)).
179. More basically, evils have been perceived in the entanglement of government in the
political process. In connection with the public financing of elections, Chief Justice Burger
warned of the government regulation and control that may result from the granting of government funds to political parties. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 248-49 (1976) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). If the auditing of the records of political parties
receiving funds can be regarded as a step toward government control, it would seem that the
financing of partisan causes by the government is at least equally suspect.
180. A constitutional amendment, the most basic form of government change, %vasat issue in
both Bellotti and Boston. 435 U.S. at 769; Mass. at -,
380 N.E.2d at 630. In one case of
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A further risk of government advocacy is that the authoritative voice with
which the government appears to speak on a matter of public policy may
preclude the unequivocal exercise of sovereign power by the voters that is
theoretically the attractive feature of referenda. 18' Rather than engaging in
reasoned consideration of the issues, voters may simply defer to what they
consider the experienced judgment of government, or they may reject a
position merely because they perceive it as the preference of an unpopular
government. Partisan speech, identified as emanating from government, thus
seems more likely to distract the voters from the issues than to inform them,
particularly in a referendum context.
Moreover, government advocacy would seem to have an unhappy effect on
the goals cherished by the Meiklejohn theory of the first amendment. 8 2 If the
people are to act in a sovereign governing capacity, the taking of a partisan
position by the government would seem to undermine the subservient role
that government institutions should play with respect to the controlling will of
the people. Authoritative government pronouncements on public issues before
the votes are counted would seem to inhibit the subsequent exercise of the
people's governing power; it implies that the government would be unresponsive to the people's wishes, should they differ from the government's own
view.
2.

The Rights of Dissenting Taxpayers

In addition to the potential disadvantages of government speech from the
point of view of the hearers, the very fact that government advocacy is
financed by public tax funds implicates the rights of those who dissent from
the government position. In view of an available alternative, it appears that
the first amendment interest in information is more than adequately served
without government expenditure in partisan efforts. The right of elected
officials to speak out on their own is unquestioned in Boston. The very
newsworthiness of the utterance of such officials ensures the dissemination of
their views. 1 83 This alternative makes possible an active role for government
without expending the tax funds of dissenters.
government advocacy, a branch of the government made known its opposition to such a
constitutional amendment. Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Denver School Dist. #1,459 F.
Supp. 357, 361 (D. Colo. 1978), discussed at notes 157-60 supsi and accompanying text.
181. Similarly, "[wihen the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed
behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to
conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431
(1962). It was argued in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, that the analogy to the establishment clause
invalidated public election financing. Although the Court rejected the argument, stating that the
religion clauses had a historically different basis, id. at 93 n.127, at least one commentator has
criticized the Court's reasoning. The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 184 & n.89
(1976). Moreover, the argument impressed the Chief Justice. 424 U.S. at 248-50, 256 (Burger,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
182. Meiklejohn, supra note 5, at 245.
183. See Affidavit of John G. Fabiano, Exhibits A-I, City of Boston v. Anderson, 99 S. Ct.
346 (1978) (collecting numerous newspaper reports detailing Mayor White's support of the
classification amendment). The dissent of Justice White in Beltotti, which characterized corporate
advocacy as the views of a few corporate officials financed at the expense of all stockholders, may
even more accurately describe government advocacy, since few government officials are

1979]

MUNICIPAL FREE SPEECH

1135

Furthermore, cutting off the government from the use of public funds to
promote its "official" view cannot be characterized as a restriction on speech.
Although under Buckley v. Valeo, 184 the expenditure of money is a protectable aspect of speech, the Massachusetts court recognized that the government's misallocation of funds in Boston is one step removed from the
individual contributions of money to a political campaign involved in
Buckley.' 85 Boston addresses not only the simple act of expenditure but
whether the public funds may be legitimately devoted to advocacy in the first
place.
There are other aspects of the problem of dissenters' rights in Boston. The
degree of compulsion experienced by dissenters is far greater in Boston than in
Bellotti. The city's dissenting taxpayers were in effect compelled to subsidize
the city's view. While Bellotti was, in the majority view, not a situation in
which the support of dissenting shareholders was compelled,' 8 6 the inability
of Boston residents to avoid their taxes and the burden of moving to avoid
such support would entail coercion akin to that in Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education,5 7 where the choice was between compulsory financial support of
union advocacy or forgoing employment. When the government itself
chooses to devote the tax funds of dissenters to the support of its own views,
the degree of compulsion is at its highest.
It has been suggested that dissenting taxpayers are no different from those
persons who are in some way disaffected by the inevitable operation of the
system of majority rule.' 88 Citizens who desire government action of a kind
different from that espoused by the majority that directs the government have
no right to withdraw their support simply because the government cannot
conform to their wishes. Yet the majority rule situation seems distinguishable.
The essential difference lies in Professor Emerson's concept of a proper
"governmental function" and in Justice Douglas' idea of associational purpose. By way of illustration, Emerson observes that "[i]t is not the function of
the government to get itself reelected."' 8 9 In the context of the expenditure of
union funds contributed by dissenters, Justice Douglas clarifies the idea
further: by devoting the funds collected in common from group members to
ideological causes, "the group compels an individual to support with his
money causes beyond what gave rise to the need for group action."'9 0
sufficiently powerful to formulate policy. Additionally, requiring the government to speak
through its officials and to avoid tax-financed advocacy seems desirable in another respect:
hearers are likely to perceive an elected official both as a member of government and as a partisan
politician. His support for a referendum proposal is likely to be regarded in this latter capacity,
and thus does not carry with it the authoritative impact conveyed by a message promulgated by
the government and paid for with city funds. Essential information can therefore be conveyed
while avoiding possible prejudicial effects.
184.

424 U.S. 1 (1976).

185. Mass. at n.15, 380 N.E.2d at 637 n.15.
186. See notes 83-85 supra and accompanying text.
187. 431 U.S. 209 (1977), discussed at notes 88-89, 95 supra and accompanying text.
188. Jurisdictional Statement at 33, City of Boston v. Anderson, 99 S. Ct. 50 (1978).
189. T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 699 (1970).
190. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 777 (1961) (Douglas. J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
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Similarly, people associate in government in such a way that their individual
sovereignty is, in some limited sense, sacrificed so that the sovereign power of
the government may be exercised in furtherance of the good of all. 19 1 A
government's police power is one legitimate expression of this theory. But the
people withhold from government interference the power of free speech.' 92
Thus, precisely because "[g]overnments . . . deriv[e] their just powers from
the consent of the governed ....
193 attempts by the government to shape
that consent do not serve a "governmental function." Such attempts exceed
the need for group action because it is not a purpose of government to control
or influence opinion.
Furthermore, the devices of the candidate election and the referendum are
designed to measure public feeling so that majority rule can be effectuated.
Government political speech therefore appears suspect in an election context:
since the pending election is to determine the authoritative will of the people,
it is obvious that prior to the election no established public 94
policy exists on
behalf of which the government may undertake to speak.'
Finally, implicit in Boston is the issue of whether the degree of support
which the paying of taxes lends to a city's dissemination of views is too remote
to impinge upon first amendment interests. It has been suggested that the
Court, through its failure to address the issue, has "tacitly accepted" 95 the
9 6
hypothesis, contained in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wooley v. Maynard,1
that the support lent to government advocacy by the payment of taxes would
be devoid of sufficient "affirmation of belief" to require first amendment
protection.' 9 7 The argument is essentially the same as that of Justice Harlan,
who reasoned that a member's payment of dues to the general fund of a
union,' 98 or to a bar association,' 99 is a step so far removed from the
association's subsequent decision to employ those funds to support a political
position that it could not possibly be understood to identify the member with
20 1
200
In essence, the "difference of degree"
the collective view of the group.
191. See, e.g., J. Gough, John Locke's Political Philosophy 31 (1973).
192. Meiklejohn, supra note 5, at 253-54.
193. Declaration of Independence.
194. Other government communicative activities are distinguishable in that they have a valid
public purpose. The promotion of economic growth through tourism is a legitimate and
authorized function for which the government may expend funds in order to communicate the
benefits of a particular state. But see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (ideological
slogan appearing on state license plate cannot be justified as designed to promote tourist
interest). Similarly, the printing of legislative reports taking a partisan view on a particular
subject or the publication of a dissenting court opinion, though undertaken at public expense, do
not implicate the right of dissent, since they serve an entirely informational purpose. Their aim is
not the persuasion of citizens.
195. Jurisdictional Statement at 33, City of Boston v. Anderson, 99 S. Ct. 50 (1978).
196. 430 U.S. 705 (1977), discussed at notes 96-98 supra and accompanying text.
197. Id. at 721 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist posited that if the state
were to erect and maintain, at taxpayer expense, billboards bearing an ideological message, the
taxpayers, while having "fostered" its spread, would not have been required to "assert as true"
the message, and therefore would have no first amendment claim. Id.
198. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
199. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
200. Id. at 857-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
201. Compare International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 788 (1961) (Black, J.,
dissenting) with Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 858 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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between a compelled flag salute 202 and mere financial support is too great;
the financial support would be simply too remote.
In light of Buckley, however, such an argument must be rejected. In that
case, money, the means by which speech may effectively be heard, was
virtually equated with speech for first amendment purposes.2 0 3 Campaign
contributions, while subject to limitations on amount, were acknowledged to
be a show of support. 20 4 Furthermore, in a portion of the opinion upholding
the constitutionality of the use of tax money to finance federal elections, the
Court felt compelled to distinquish prior dissenting opinions which had
argued that the coerced financial support of ideological positions indeed
violated first amendment protection. 20 5 By doing so, the Court recognized
that, but for the noncoercive and nonpartisan nature of public election
financing via the tax check-off system, the first amendment claim of compelled support might lie even for taxpayers. In Boston, the elements of coercion
and partisanship are both present. When a portion of a taxpayer's assessment
is diverted to the financing of municipal advocacy, he should, therefore, have
2 06
a sufficient interest to assert the infringement of first amendment rights.
CONCLUSION

Can there not be a government in which majorities do not virtually decide right and
wrong, but conscience?-in which majorities decide only those questions to which the
rule of expediency is applicable? Must the citizen ever for a moment, or in the least
degree, resign his conscience to the legislator?20 '
In an age in which the various media stand ready to promote any viewpoint, a program of partisan advocacy may appear to be an alluring
alternative for a hard-pressed municipality. When the government enters
politics under the guise of disseminating information, however, it does not
serve the government function of expediency, but seeks instead to shape
decisions which must be reserved to the conscience of the individual. Despite
the expanding role of government, the exercise of the sovereign will to which
the government is subservient is not a fit subject for government interference.
The social interests in open elections and in maintaining the freedom of
dissent dictate that governments can best serve their citizens by refraining
from partisan advocacy.
Charles E. Ryan
202. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), discussed at note 87 supr2.
203. See 424 U.S. at 19.
204. Id. at 21; see Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355 (1976) (compelled political contribution
through patronage system is "tantamount to coerced belief").
205. 424 U.S. at 91 & n.124 (citing Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 871 (1961) (Black, J.,
dissenting); id. at 882 (Douglas, J., dissenting); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740, 778 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 788-92 (Black, J., dissenting)).
206. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-4, at 590 (quoted in Anderson v. City of
Mass. at n.19, 380 N.E.2d at 640 n.19).
Boston, __
207. H. Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, in Thoreau: Walden and Other Writings 86 (J. Krutch
ed. 1971).

